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View of Article 136
I. INTRODUCTION
A parent's right to control and direct the upbringing of a child
is one of the oldest and most fundamental of the individual
liberties afforded by the Constitution.' The United States Supreme
Court has recognized this right within the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment,2 allowing parents the right to
"establish a home and bring up children."3 The right to make
visitation decisions regarding the child-determining who can see
the child and when they can do so--is inherent in the power to
direct a child's upbringing.4 On the other hand, governments have
a legitimate interest in promoting and maintaining extended family
relationships between children and their extended family.5 To
accomplish this legitimate purpose, state governments have
enacted statutes that allow a child's grandparents or collateral
relatives to petition for visitation rights in certain situations.6 In
passing such legislation, however, state legislatures must not
unconstitutionally infringe on the parent's right to direct the
rearing of the child. In sum, in order to withstand constitutionality
challenges, grandparental and third party visitation statutes must
strike a balance between the government's interest in maintaining
extended family relationships and a parent's constitutional right to
direct the "care, custody, and control of their children."7
Copyright 2009, by WILLIAM BRADLEY KLINE.
1. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). See also Pierce v. Soc'y of
Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. (emphasis added).
3. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
4. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 ("The child is not the mere creature of the
state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.").
5. Reinhardt v. Reinhardt, 720 So. 2d 78, 80 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1998).
6. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136 (1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-
103 (West 2004).
7. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
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The Louisiana Legislature has addressed these two competing
interests in the Louisiana Civil Code8 and its revised statutes.
Enacted in 1993, both provisions provide a means for third party
family members to petition for visitation rights to a child relative.
Civil Code article 136 allows grandparents, step-grandparents,
former step-parents, and relatives by blood or affinity to seek
reasonable visitation rights. 10 The listed parties can be granted
visitation rights in "extraordinary circumstances" and when the
visitation is in the child's best interest, and article 136 provides an
illustrative list of five factors to be considered by a court in
determining if the visitation is within the child's best interest."i
Alternatively, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:344 provides
standing for a child's grandparents and siblings to seek reasonable
visitation in cases where one parent has died, has been interdicted,
or has been incarcerated.' 2 The statute allows visitation to those
parties both when the child's parents were married then divorced
or separated and when the child's parents lived in open
concubinage before the death or incarceration of a parent. 13
Finally, in the case of a conflict between these two provisions,
section C of article 136 defers to Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 9:344.14 The latter statute, therefore, applies where a parent
is dead, interdicted, or incarcerated and the absent parent's parent
or a child's sibling seeks visitation of the child. In other
"extraordinary circumstances,"' 5 article 136 provides any relative
the right to petition for visitation.
Of the two legislative enactments, the first to come under
constitutional attack was article 136. In Reinhardt v. Reinhardt, the
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal held that the article did not
substantively intrude on a mother's right to deny visitation to her
child's paternal relatives. 16 According to the majority, article 136
was narrowly drawn to allow visitation only in "set, restrictive
conditions."' Therefore, the article did not unduly infringe on the
mother's constitutional right.
8. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136.
9. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:344 (2008).
10. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136(B).
11. Id.
12. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:344.
13. Id.
14. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 136(C).
15. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136(B).
16. Reinhardt v. Reinhardt, 720 So. 2d 78, 80 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1998).
17. Id.
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The Reinhardt decision, however, preceded the United States
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Troxel v. Granville,i8 a case
in which the Court struck down an overly broad Washington state
statute providing standing for anyone to petition for visitation
rights at any time.19 Since Troxel, a number of state courts have
addressed the constitutionality of their own grandparental and third
party visitation statutes, including Louisiana.2 0  However,
Louisiana's appellate courts have only addressed Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 9:344 in the post-Troxel context, 2 while
no Louisiana court has directly examined article 136 after the 1998
Reinhardt decision. As recently as 2007, the Louisiana First
Circuit has recognized the potential overbreadth of article 136,
suggesting that the article may improperly infringe on a parent's
substantive due process right.22 The article is clearly more
narrowly drawn than the all-inclusive Washington statute, 3 but it
is also broader in scope than section 9:344, which more strictly
limits both the class of persons permitted to seek visitation and the
circumstances in which they can do so. 24 In order for article 136 to
withstand a constitutional challenge, the Louisiana Supreme Court
must both impose a heightened burden of proof on the petitioning
party to show extraordinary circumstances and indulge a strong
presumption that a parent's visitation decisions are made in the
child's best interest.25 Without observing these principles, the
application of article 136 may lead to unconstitutional state court
review of parents' fundamental child-rearing decisions.
This Note's purpose is two-fold: (1) to provide an overview of
grandparental and third party visitation case law from Louisiana
appellate courts, other state high courts, and the Supreme Court's
Troxel decision, and (2) to address the facial constitutionality and
the potential unconstitutional application of Louisiana Civil Code
article 136 in light of the rulings from these courts. Part II of this
18. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (decided two years after the
Louisiana first circuit opinion in Reinhardt).
19. Id.
20. See infra Part III.A-B.
21. See Dupre v. Dupre, 834 So. 2d 1272 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2002); GaIjour
v. Harris, 795 So. 2d 350 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 793 So. 2d 1229 (La.),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1020 (2001).
22. Shaw v. Dupuy, 961 So. 2d 5, 10-11 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2007) (Whipple,
J., concurring) (holding that article 136 allows any relative to seek visitation by
subjecting the parent's visitation decisions to state court review).
23. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.10.160(3) (West 1994).
24. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:344 (2008) (allowing only grandparents and
siblings of a child to seek visitation, and limiting the situations to the death,
interdiction, or incarceration of one parent).
25. See infra Part IV.B.
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Note details the Supreme Court's Troxel decision. Part 1II presents
Louisiana's jurisprudential reaction to Troxel concerning both
Louisiana statutory sources for grandparental and third party
visitation rights. Part IV examines post-Troxel state decisions in
Pennsylvania, New York, and Minnesota, including a discussion of
those states' respective visitation statutes in comparison with article
136. Part V analyzes article 136 in light of the decisions discussed in
Parts II, IlI, and IV and provides constitutionally sound points of
law for interpreting article 136.
II. THE TROXEL v. GRANVILLE DECISION
A. Background: The Changing American Family
In the decades leading up to the Supreme Court's decision in
Troxel, the definition of the "traditional" American family
drastically changed. An increase in broken families, a higher
divorce rate, an increase in children living in grandparents' homes,
and an increasingly mobile society have factored into the
legislative move toward preventing the deterioration of the
traditional family.26 As part of that effort, grandparental and third
party visitation statutes seek to foster and maintain the relationship
between a child and the paternal or maternal relatives, an objective
that courts have held is a legitimate governmental interest.27 In
fact, all fifty states eventually adopted statutes that provided some
form of third party visitation.28 However, the clash between state
interests and parental fundamental rights eventually led to the
constitutional challenge in Troxel, where a single mother fought
against the visitation rights of her daughters' paternal
grandparents. The following section outlines the facts,arguments, and constitutional issues at play in that case.
26. Mark Moody, Constitutional Questions Regarding Grandparent
Visitation and Due Process Standards, 60 Mo. L. REv. 195 (1995).
27. See Reinhardt v. Reinhardt, 720 So. 2d 78, 80 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1998)("After the fragmentation of the children's primary family through divorce, the
state has a legitimate and substantial interest in encouraging beneficial extended
family relationships with children.").
28. See Robyn L. Ginsberg, Grandparent's Visitation Rights: The
Constitutionality of New York's Domestic Relations Law Section 72 After Troxel
v. Granville, 65 ALB. L. REv. 205, 205 n.2 (2001).
29. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
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B. The Supreme Court's Decision
1. Justice O'Connor's Plurality Opinion: Facts, Procedural
History, and Judgment
Troxel's facts are simple. Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel
were involved in a relationship but remained unmarried. 30 The
couple had two daughters, Isabella and Natalie.3 After the
relationship ended, Brad lived with his parents and frequently
brought his daughters home for weekend visits until two years later
when Brad committed suicide. 32 His parents (the plaintiffs)
enjoyed visitation with their granddaughters on a regular basis for
a period after Brad's death, but soon thereafter Tommie sought to
limit their visitation to one visit per month.33 Those circumstances
led the plaintiffs to file a petition against Tommie in Washington
state court, seeking greater visitation rights under Washington
Revised Code sections 26.09.240 and 26.10.160(3). 34 In the trial
court, the plaintiffs were awarded visitation with their
granddaughters for one weekend per month, one week during the
summer, and four hours on each of the plaintiffs' birthdays, a
judgment which Tommie appealed.35 After remanding the case
back to the trial court for written findings of fact and conclusions
of law, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed the visitation
order, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standingbecause the action
was not brought pursuant to a custody action. 6 The Washington
Supreme Court granted review and consolidated the case with two
other visitation cases, 37 holding first that the plaintiff grandparents
had standing despite the lack of a custody proceeding.3 ' Further,
the Washington Supreme Court held that Washington Revised
Statutes section 26.10.160(3) 31 (hereinafter "Washington statute")
30. Id. at 60.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 60-61.
34. Id. at 61. Only the latter statute, Washington Revised Statutes section
26.10.160(3), was at issue in the Supreme Court's decision.
35. Id
36. Id. at 61-62.
37. In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21 (Wash. 1998), affd Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
38. Id. at 26 ("By its plain language, [the statute] gives nonparents an
avenue to obtain visitation rights with children outside of a custody
proceeding.").
39. WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. § 26.10.160(3) (West 1994): "Any person may
petition the court for visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to,
custody proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any person when
NOTE 4752009]
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was facially unconstitutional on two grounds. First, according to
that Court, the Constitution allows court intervention in the
parent's right to rear a child only in order to prevent harm to the
child. Since the Washington statute contained no required showing
of harm to the child, it failed that constitutional standard.4 ° Second,
the statute was grossly overbroad in allowing "any" third party the
right to petition for visitation at "any time. ''4 1 With four
Washington Supreme Court justices dissenting, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.42
Justice O'Connor authored the plurality opinion in Troxel.43
The opinion set out several important considerations that protect
against an unconstitutional infringement on a parent's due process
right. First, O'Connor argued, a fit parent's child-rearing decisions
are presumed to be made in the best interest of the child.44
Accordingly, such a child rearing decision should be afforded great
deference by the courts, for a court's determination should not
automatically prevail over a fit parent's estimation of a child's best
interest.45 The manner in which the Washington statute was drafted
did not give any greater weight to the fit parent's decision than to a
court's determination as to a child's best interest.46 Second, the
Washington statute allowed any visitation decision to be
challenged and subjected to state court review by anyone at any
time.47 To allow challenges by any third party to potentially all
decisions regarding a child's visitation would unconstitutionally
infringe on the parent's right to make visitation decisions within
the framework of the parental due process right.48 Finally, a
positive burden should be placed on the petitioner to prove that
visitation would be in the best interest of the child.49 The lower
courts' interpretation of the Washington statute erroneously placed
the burden on the fit parent to disprove that visitation would be in
the child's best interest (in other words, to prove that visitation
visitation may serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been
any change of circumstances."
40. Smith, 969 P.2d at 30.
41. Id. at27-31.
42. Troxel v. Granville, 527 U.S. 1069 (1999) (granting certiorari).
43. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60-75 (2000).
44. Id. at 68. In the instant case, there was no allegation that defendant was
not a fit parent.
45. Id. at 68-69.
46. Id. at 67.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 68.
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would "adversely impact" the child).5° This misplaced burden of
proof undermines the above-mentioned deference 5 1 that should be
given to the visitation decisions of fit custodial parents.
As applied to the facts, the Washington statute's shortcomings
infringed on the defendant's parental rights. Tommie Granville's
decision to limit the plaintiffs' visitation with her daughters was
not given proper weight by the statute. As a fit parent, her
visitation decisions-presumptively made in her daughters' best
interest-were subject to court review, and her determination of
those interests was trumped by the Washington Supreme Court's
view. Her failure to show that that the plaintiffs' visitation
negatively impacts her daughters ultimately factored against her in
the trial court's visitation order. Because of the Washington
statute's overbreadth, misplaced burden, and lack of parental
presumption, Tommie's fundamental parental rights were unduly
affected.52  Therefore, the Washington statute was held
unconstitutional in its application in Troxel.
5 3
2. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Rehnquist joined Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion, while Justices Souter
5
' and Thomas55
wrote concurring opinions and Justices Stevens,5 6 Scalia,57 and
Kennedy 58 dissented. The number of written opinions in Troxel
illustrates both the conflicting issues and differing viewpoints on
Justice O'Connor's considerations. This section briefly examines
those points emphasized by the concurring and dissenting
opinions.
The two concurrences in Troxel demonstrate several other
important considerations in a constitutional analysis of
grandparental and third party visitation statutes. First, Justice
Souter agreed with the Washington Supreme Court's judgment that
50. Id. at 69 ("In effect, the [Washington Supreme Court] judge placed on
Granville, the fit custodial parent, the burden of disproving that visitation would
be in the best interest of her daughters.").
51. Id. at 67.
52. Id. at 75.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 75-79 (Souter, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 80-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. Id at 91-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia believes that he, as a
judge, has no power to deny legal effect to laws that seek to inhibit the parental
right to control a child's rearing. His opinion is not discussed further in this article.
58. Id. at 93-102 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
NOTE 4772009]
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the Washington statute at issue was unconstitutional on its face.59
According to Justice Souter, the plain wording of the Washington
statute, rather than its application to a particular set of facts, was
the source of the statute's unconstitutional overbreadth.6 ° Second,
Justice Souter recognized the Washington Supreme Court's power
to narrowly construe its own state statute when analyzing the
statute's constitutionality.6' Finally, Justice Thomas expressed the
need to apply a strict standard of scrutiny to statutes that infringe
on a parent's fundamental right to rear a child, a standard that the
plurality failed to establish.62
Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion took exception to Justice
Souter's concurring opinion. Justice Stevens stated that Justice
Souter's finding of facial unconstitutionality required that the
Washington statute be unconstitutional in all of its applications. 63
Since the Washington statute could be constitutionally applied in
certain situations, the Washington courts had the responsibility of
determining if the application of the statute was constitutional in
this particular case.
6
The plurality opinion, along with the concurring and dissenting
opinions discussed in this section, present multiple issues bearing
on the constitutionality of third party visitation statutes. The
varying Troxel opinions are indications that the law on third party
visitation statutes is far from settled. The following section
provides an overview of these issues as well as a perspective on the
impact the Troxel decision made on state visitation statutes.
59. Id. at 75 (Souter, J., concurring). See also supra Part II.B.1.
60. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 76 (Souter, J., concurring).
61. As mentioned earlier, the Washington Supreme Court held its statute
unconstitutional because it contained no threshold showing of harm to the child
and allowed any person to petition for visitation under any circumstances. See
supra Part II.B. 1. In Justice Souter's opinion, imposing such requirements on
the Washington statute was within the authority of that state's high court.
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 79 (Souter, J., concurring).
62. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 85 (Stevens, J., dissenting). According to this dissent, a myriad of
circumstances exist where a relative seeking visitation was a primary caretaker
of the child at one point, and allowing an action for visitation in those situations
would not be unconstitutionally burdensome to the parent. Id.
64. Id. at 81-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The task of reviewing a trial
court's application of a state statute to the particular facts of a case is one that
should be performed in the first instance by the state appellate courts.").
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C. Summary: Open-Ended Issues from Troxel
1. Relevant Issues in Third Party Visitation
Several key issues emerged from Troxel that require
consideration in a constitutional analysis of any grandparental or
third party visitation statute. Although Troxel may not have settled
all of these issues (in fact, one could argue that the Supreme Court
opinion raised more issues than it settled), the considerations are
important in distinguishing a constitutionally sound visitation
statute from an overbroad, unconstitutional one.
There are several issues discussed in the plurality opinion,65 the
plurality's solutions to which were uncontroverted by the other
justices. First, Troxel focuses on the presumption that a fit parent
makes child-rearing decisions based on the parent's estimation of
the child's best interest.66 If a parent is found to be an adequate
caretaker (as the defendant was in Troxel), the court has no interest
in imposing its determination of the child's best interest in favor of
the parent's decisions. 67 Without the presumption, any visitation
decision by a parent, however reasonable, may be overruled after
state court review, allowing a judge to decide a child's best interest
despite the parent's superior position to judge those interests. 68
This presumption is crucial to the parental due process right.
Second, a heightened scrutiny standard is appropriate for
considering statutes that tend to infringe on fundamental rights.
The parental right to direct the "care, custody, and control" is a
fundamental right implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment.
70
Although the exact standard is unclear from the plurality in Troxel,
Justice Thomas's concurrence states that strict scrutiny should be
employed when examining statutes that impose on fundamental
liberties-a standard that is uncontested by other Troxelopinions.71 It is apparent from Troxel, however, that some form of
heightened standard should be used when substantive due process
rights are at issue.
72
Third, the Troxel opinions recognize that statutory overbreadth,
particularly with regard to the class of persons to which a third
party visitation statute provides standing, will lead to
65. Id. at 60-75 (plurality opinion).
66. Id. at 68 (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)).
67. Id. at 68-69.
68. Id. at 67.
69. Id. at 65.
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
71. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 65 (plurality opinion).
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unconstitutional infringement on parental rights. At the very least,
one can learn from Troxel that a third party visitation statute that
allows any person to petition for visitation rights is at a high risk of
invalidity,7 either on its face or in its application.
Troxel also raises two issues that divided the Supreme Court.
First, regarding statutory overbreadth, Troxel found that the statute
in question was unconstitutional in its application to the relevant
facts.7 The Washington Supreme Court, as well as Justice Souter
believed that the Washington statute was facially unconstitutional.r
If a statute is facially unconstitutional, it is unconstitutional in all
instances-no case-by-case inquiry is needed to determine if a
parent's constitutional rights were violated in the particular
circumstances. Since the Troxel judgment declined to find the
Washington statute facially invalid, presumably all other third
party visitation statutes more narrowly drawn than the Washington
statute must be examined on a case-by-case basis. Depending on
the particular circumstances, a case-by-case analysis may greatly
differ from an analysis focusing solely on a statute's facial
constitutionality.
Finally, Troxel brings to light certain issues regarding burdens
of proof. According to the plurality, a burden of disproving that
visitation is in the child's best interest should not be placed on the
defendant seeking to deny or limit visitation.76 Whether the party
seeking visitation bears a burden of proving that the visitation is in
the child's best interest is unclear from the Troxel decision.77 The
burden of proving the child's best interest corresponds with the fit
parent presumption. Therefore, if a fit parent's visitation decision
is presumed to be in the child's best interest, that parent should
have no burden to prove that the decision was in fact made in the
child's best interest. If such a presumption exists, the petitioning
party bears the burden of rebutting that presumption. This Note
will address these issues in the analysis of Louisiana Civil Code
article 136.78
73. Id. at 67.
74. Id. at 75 ("We therefore hold that the application of [section]
26.10.160(3) to Granville and her family violated her due process right to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her daughters.").
75. In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21 (Wash. 1998), aff'd Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Troxel, 530 U.S. at 76-77 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
76. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69-70.
77. Id.
78. See infra Part IV.
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2. Troxel's Immediate Impact
What effect does Troxel have on grandparental and third party
visitation statutes? Quite simply, no state visitation statute is
completely safe from constitutional challenge. Even if a statute is
narrowly drawn to avoid facial invalidity, situations may exist
where such a statute could unconstitutionally infringe on a parent's
fundament child-rearing right. Had the Supreme Court not struck
down the Washington statute in Troxel, nearly all third party
visitation statutes would appear constitutionally sound, given the
blatant overbreadth of the Washington statute. Troxel appears to
have set an extreme on one end of the spectrum of
constitutionality, but it failed to draw a distinct line in the sand
between narrowly drawn valid statutes and overbroad
unconstitutional statutes.
The next section will attempt to find that fine line through an
examination of the jurisprudence from Louisiana and other states.
Louisiana's reaction to Troxel and recent state supreme court
decisions shed some light on the constitutional viability of Civil
Code article 136.
III. STATE COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF NON-PARENT VISITATION
STATUTES
In the wake of the Troxel decision in 2000, many state courts
were confronted with constitutionality questions in reference to
their respective grandparental or third party visitation statutes. The
issues presented by Troxel have been addressed and tackled by
numerous courts, including at least three state supreme courts in
the very recent past.79 In order to gauge the fallout from the first
(and only) United States Supreme Court decision concerning the
constitutionality of third party visitation statutes, an examination
of these recent state high court decisions and Louisiana's
jurisprudence regarding both of its visitation provisions is in order.
The subsequent sections will discuss Louisiana's pre- and post-
Troxel jurisprudence with respect to Civil Code article 1368 and
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:344,2 followed by recent
79. See infra Part III.B. See, e.g., Soohoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815
(Minn. 2007); E.S. v. P.D., 863 N.E.2d 100 (N.Y. 2007); Harrold v. Collier, 836
N.E.2d 1165 (Ohio 2005); Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875 (Pa. 2006), cert.
denied, 127 S. Ct. 1876 (2007).
80. Troxel, 530 U.S. 57.
81. LA. CIV. CODEANN. art. 136 (1999).
82. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:344 (2008).
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decisions by the high courts of Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, and
Minnesota. 
3
A. Louisiana Appellate Jurisprudence
1. Pre-Troxel: Reinhardt v. Reinhardt
8 4
As discussed in Part I of this Note, Louisiana has two
legislatively-enacted sources for grandgarental and third party
visitation rights: Civil Code article 136 5 and Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 9:344.86 In pertinent part, article 136 states:
"Under extraordinary circumstances, a relative, by blood or affinity,
or a former step[-]parent or step[-]grandparent, not granted custody
of the child may be granted reasonable visitation rights if the court
finds that it is in the best interest of the child ....
The article allows any family member to seek visitation of a
child, but only under "extraordinary circumstances" and only if the
visitation "is in the best interest of the child., 88 In comparison to
the Washington statute89 at issue in Troxel, article 136 most
noticeably limits the class of persons eligible to petition for
visitation from "any person" 90 to "any relative by blood or
affinity," including former step-grandparents or grandparents. 91
Article 136 also limits the circumstances for bringing a visitation
action from "any time, 92 in the Washington statute to only
"extraordinary circumstances." 93 At first glance, article 136 is
obviously more narrowly drawn than the Washington statute that
was found unconstitutional in Troxel.94 Insightful Louisiana
jurisprudence regarding article 136 is limited to Reinhardt v.
Reinhardt,95 a case decided by the Louisiana First Circuit Court of
Appeal two years prior to Troxel.
83. See Soohoo, 731 N.W.2d 815; E.S., 863 N.E.2d 100; Harrold, 836
N.E.2d 1165; Hiller, 904 A.2d 875.
84. Reinhardt v. Reinhardt, 720 So. 2d 78 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1998).
85. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136. The constitutionality of this provision is
the subject of the analysis portion of this article. See infra Part IV.
86. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:344.
87. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136(B).
88. Id.
89. WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. § 26.10.160(3) (West 1994).
90. Id.
91. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136(B).
92. WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. § 26.10.160(3).
93. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136(B).
94. See Huber v. Midkiff, 838 So. 2d 771, 778 (La. 2003) (Weimer, J.,
concurring).
95. Reinhardt v. Reinhardt, 720 So. 2d 78 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1998).
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In Reinhardt, a mother appealed a trial court visitation order,
seeking to terminate visitation between her children and their
paternal relatives. 96 The appellant challenged the constitutionality
of article 136, which was the only issue on appeal.97 Applying a
strict scrutiny test, Judge Fitzsimmons held that article 136 was
constitutional, finding that the provision was narrowly drawn to
allow visitation "only under set, restrictive conditions." 98 The
Reinhardt opinion, however, also announced a structure to ensure
constitutional application of article 136. When determining a
visitation order, Judge Fitzsimmons explained, the trial court
should first find "extraordinary circumstances" required by the
provision99 and should include a detailed factual description of
those circumstances in its written or oral reasons for judgment. 100
After this initial finding of extraordinary circumstances, the trial
court must then determine if the sought-after visitation is in the
child's best interest, facts which should also be included in the
court's written reasons. 101 Finding extraordinary circumstances
before examining the child's best interest is critical to a
constitutionally acceptable application of article 136, according to
Reinhardt.10 2 Finally, the burden of proving both the existence of
"extraordinary circumstances" and that visitation serves the "best
interest of the child" should be placed on the petitioning party to
protect the parent's due process right. 10 3 By setting forth a standard
of application for article 136, the Reinhardt majority also
recognized the potential unconstitutional application of the article
in certain situations. 10 4 Failure to make these required findings in
the correct order or misplacement of the dual burden of proof may
lead to a visitation award that infringes on a parent's fundamental
right. 105
96. Id. at 79.
97. Id. Although the father was incarcerated, Louisiana Revised Statute
section 9:344 was not applicable presumably-as the facts are incomplete-
because the parties seeking visitation were not parents or siblings of the
incarcerated father.
98. Id. at 79-80.
99. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136(B) (1999).
100. Reinhardt, 720 So. 2d at 80.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. ("To avoid an unconstitutional application of article 136B, the trial
court must be protective of the parent's fundamental right of privacy in child
rearing and cognizant of the 'extraordinary circumstances' and 'best interest'
codal requirements.").
105. Id.
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Judge Guidry dissented from the Reinhardt opinion. 10 6 In his
opinion, he argued that the state interest in "fostering extended
family relationships' 7 may be legitimate, but it does not reach the
level of "compelling" to survive a strict scrutiny test. 10 8 The
dissent postulated that a compelling state interest in article 136
would be to "protect the health and welfare of children," an interest
that would require a finding that a denial of visitation with the
petitioning party would cause "substantial harm to the child."'10 9
Without this heightened finding of substantial harm, the state
interest in maintaining relationships between child and relatives is
crushed by a parent's constitutional right to direct the upbringing
of a child.'10 Therefore according to the Reinhardt dissent, article
136 is unconstitutional.1 "
Even before Troxel came down, the Louisiana first circuit was
split on the constitutionality of article 136. Although holding the
article constitutional, the majority in Reinhardt recognized the
potential for unconstitutional infringement in the application of
article 136,112 and the Reinhardt dissent took issue with the
provision's facial constitutionality.1 13 Using hindsight and the
plurality opinion from Troxel, 1 4 a facial challenge to article 136
would be a long shot. The unconstitutional application of article
136, however, is still a viable argument in light of Troxel.
2. Post-Troxel: Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:344 and
Shaw v. Dupuy"1
5
Virtually all of Louisiana's post-Troxel jurisprudence regarding
the constitutionality of its grandparental and third party visitation
statutes focuses on Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:344. 16
Further, the Louisiana Supreme Court has yet to rule on the
106. Id. at 81 (Guidry, J., dissenting).
107. Id. (citing to Judge Fitzsimmons' majority opinion).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id, ("[T]he state's interest here may be legitimate in fostering extended
family relationships, but it is not compelling and clearly does not outweigh the
parents' constitutionally protected right to autonomy in child rearing decisions.").
111. Id.
112. Id. at 80.
113. Id, at 81 (Guidry, J., dissenting).
114. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 75 (2000) (finding that Washington
Revised Statutes section 26.10.160(3) was unconstitutional in its application to
the circumstances and not facially invalid).
115. Shaw v. Dupuy, 961 So. 2d 5 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 951 So.
2d 1092 (La. 2007).
116. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:344 (2008).
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constitutionality of either article 136 or section 9:344, and nearly
all of the Louisiana appellate decisions on this issue have been
decided by the first circuit. 117 Louisiana Revised Statutes section
9:344 provides a child's grandparents and siblings the right to
petition for visitation when one of the child's parents is deceased,
interdicted, or incarcerated.118 The principal case concerning the
constitutionality of section 9:344 is Galjour v. Harris.119
In Gajour, the first circuit declined to apply the holding in
Troxel to a court visitation order pursuant to Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 9:344. 12 According to the majority opinion,
Louisiana's statute was more narrowly drawn, limiting both the
class of persons with standing (grandparents and siblings) and the
circumstances in which visitation could be sought (death,
interdiction, or incarceration of a parent). 12 1 Also, a grant of
visitation under section 9:344 did not infringe on the parent's
constitutional right or the parent's relationship with the child
because the visitation must be "reasonable" and "in the best
interest of the child."'122 In distinguishing Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 9:344 from the Washington statute in Troxel, 23 the
first circuit noted that the former was limited in scope to
grandparents and siblings in distinct circumstances whereas the
latter opened the door to anyone at anytime. 124 The Louisiana
Legislature limited the scope of section 9:344,125 most probably in
an attempt to protect the parental right to direct a child's
upbringing while promoting the state interest in "fostering
extended family relationships' ' 26 in certain defined circumstances.
The Gajour rationale was applied again by the first circuit in
Wood v. Wood. 127 In that case, the first circuit affirmed its decision
in Gaijour that Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:344 was
narrowly drawn to limit challenges to a fit parent's visitation
117. The only other Louisiana appellate circuit to address the
constitutionality of either provision is the third circuit in Dupre v. Dupre. 834
So. 2d 1272 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2002).
118. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:344.
119. GaIjour v. Harris, 795 So. 2d 350 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 793
So. 2d 1229 (La.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1020 (2001).
120. Id. at 358.
121. Id.
122. Id.; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:344.
123. WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. § 26.10.160(3) (West 1994).
124. Id.; Gajour, 795 So. 2dat358.
125. Galjour, 795 So. 2d at 358.
126. See Reinhardt v. Reinhardt, 720 So. 2d 78, 81 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1998)
(Guidry, J., dissenting).
127. Wood v. Wood, 835 So. 2d 568 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2002), writ denied,
840 So. 2d 565 (La. 2003).
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decisions. 12 8 Wood, however, took Galjour a step further by
requiring that the party seeking visitation under section 9:344 bear
the burden of provinz that the visitation is "reasonable" and in the
child's best interest.' This placement of a dual burden of proof on
the nonparent seeking visitation reflects the rationale employed in
Troxel, where the Supreme Court reversed the state court's
placement of a burden on the parent by placing a burden on the
nonparent to show that a change in visitation would suit the child's
best interest. 130 The Louisiana third circuit also applied Galjour's
principles in Dupre v. Dupre,13 1 where Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 9:344 was again ruled constitutional based on its narrow
statutory language.' 2 Given the GaIjour, Wood, and Dupre
decisions, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:344, when compared
to the Washington statute, 33 is drawn narrowly enough to avoid an
unconstitutional infringement on parental due process rights.
After the Reinhardt decision in 1998, Louisiana courts have yet
to decide on the constitutionality of article 136 in a post-Troxel
setting. In the Dupre case, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of
Appeal stated-in dicta and without ruling on article 136 or
examining the Article through the veil of Troxel-that article 136
had been challenged and upheld in Reinhardt.134 In 2007, however,
a concurring opinion in Shaw v. Dupuy135 reignited the issue in the
context of Troxel. Judge Whipple of the first circuit stated that a
grandparental visitation order unconstitutionally violated a
mother's right to deny such visitation. 136 Particularly interesting,
though, was the judge's comparison of the facts in Shaw to the
type of circumstances envisioned in Troxel in which a visitation
statute could lead to an unconstitutional visitation order.' 37 This
concurring opinion, along with the incomplete case law regarding
the constitutionality of article 136, hints at the possibility of
unconstitutional application of that article-much akin to the
Troxel majority's reasoning for finding the Washington statute
unconstitutional as applied.r 3
8
128. Id. at 572-73.
129. Id. at 574; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:344 (2008).
130. See supra Part II.B.1.
131. Dupre v. Dupre, 834 So. 2d 1272 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2002).
132. Id. at 1280.
133. WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26.10.160(3) (West 1994).
134. Dupre, 834 So. 2d at 1280.
135. Shaw v. Dupuy, 961 So. 2d 5, 10-11 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2007) (Whipple,
J., concurring).
136. Id. at 11.
137. Id.
138. See supra Part II.C.1 for a discussion of the unconstitutional application
and alleged facial invalidity of Washington Revised Statutes section 26.10.160(3).
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3. Summary of Louisiana Issues and Considerations
Looking strictly at Louisiana jurisprudence, two endpoints
emerge on the spectrum of constitutionality for grandparental and
third party visitation rights. On one end sits the unconstitutional
Washington statute in Troxel-a seemingly limitless visitation
statute allowing anyone to petition for visitation rights at any time.
On the other end is Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:344, the
constitutionality of which was upheld under the Galjour-Wood
rationale. Article 136 falls somewhere in the middle as it is clearly
more narrowly drawn than the Washington statute' 1 9 but arguably
sweeps more broadly than section 9:344, as the article can be
employed by any relative who can prove "extraordinary
circumstances" (a term that is yet undefined in Louisiana visitation
law). 140
Several factors are at issue in this constitutional inquiry,
including open-ended issues leftover from Troxel.' 4 1 Issues unique
to article 136 include the level of scrutiny and the government
interest at stake, facial invalidity and unconstitutional application,
the scope of standing and circumstances, and a double burden of
proof.1  These issues, along with constitutional issues discussed in
the following section, will be discussed with regard to article 136
in Part IV of this Note.
B. Other States' Reactions to Troxel
Immediately after the Troxel decision, several state courts
addressed their grandtgarental and third party visitation laws in
light of that ruling."" Recently, four state supreme courts in
particular have passed on the constitutionality of their respective
visitation statutes, with varying results. 44 This section will examine
those cases and their relevance to Louisiana's visitation statutes.
139. WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26.10.160(3) (West 1994).
140. LA. CWr. CODE ANN. art. 136(B) (1999).
141. See supra Part II.C.1.
142. See infra Part IV.
143. See, e.g., Stacy v. Ross, 798 So. 2d 1275 (Miss. 2001); Brandon L. v.
Moats, 551 S.E.2d 674 (W. Va. 2001); In re Paternity of Roger D.H., 641
N.W.2d 440 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
144. See infra Part III.B.1-3.
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1. Ohio Supreme Court: Harrold v. Collier 145
In Harrold v. Collier, Ohio's third party visitation statutes 146
(hereinafter "Ohio statutes") were found constitutional because of
their narrow tailoring of the requirements for standing and the
required predicate conditions for bringing a visitation claim. 147 The
Ohio statutes allowed a wide class of relatives to petition for
visitation in the case of a varent's death or in the case of a child
born to unmarried parents. However, because the Ohio statutes
limited the situations in which this wide class of relatives could
bring a visitation action to certain predicate conditions, the statute
did not infringe on the parental due process right by allowing all
relatives to challenge a parent's visitation decisions.'9
The Harrold case is particularly important to an analysis of
article 136 because of the Ohio Supreme Court's examination of
standing and predicate condition requirements in conjunction. In
Troxel, the Washington statute limited neither the class of persons
nor the conditions for bringing a visitation petition. 5 ° The Ohio
statutes limit standing to a child's relatives, a class obviously
narrower than that allowed in the Washington statute. The Ohio
Supreme Court did not state whether this narrower class of persons
by itself renders the Ohio statute constitutionally narrow in scope.
When read together with its limited conditions requirement,
however, the Ohio statute's combination of narrow standing and
circumstances allowed the provisions to pass constitutional
muster. 51 Similarly, article 136 contains both a limited standing
class (i.e. relatives) and limited predicate conditions (i.e.
"extraordinary circumstances"). 152 If read together, the article may
145. Harrold v. Collier, 836 N.E.2d 1165 (Ohio 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S.
1004 (2006).
146. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.11-3109.12 (West 2005). See also id. §
3109.051; Harrold, 836 N.E.2d at 1171:
[Section] 3109.11, applies only in cases where the mother or father of
the child is deceased and limits the persons who can petition for
nonparental visitation to the parents and relatives of the deceased
mother or father. Likewise, [section] 3109.12 applies only when a child
is born to an unmarried woman and limits the persons who can petition
for nonparental visitation to the parents and relatives of the unmarried
mother and to the father and his parents or relatives, if the father has
legally acknowledged paternity or a court has declared him to be the
father.
147. Harrold, 836 N.E.2d at 1171.
148. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.11-3109.12.
149. Harrold, 836 N.E.2d at 1171.
150. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000).
151. Harold, 836 N.E.2d at 1171.
152. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 136(B) (1999).
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contain sufficiently narrow limitations to avoid unconstitutional
overbreadth.
2. Pennsylvania Supreme Court: Hiller v. Fausey'
53
In August of 2006, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided
Hiller v. Fausey,154 upholding the validity of Pennsylvania
Consolidated Statutes section 5311 (hereinafter "Pennsylvania
statute"). 155  The Pennsylvania statute allowed a child's
grandparents or great-grandparents to petition for visitation rights
when one of the child's parents was deceased and only when such
visitation would be in the child's best interest and would not
interfere with the child's relationship with the surviving parent.
156
Finding the statute valid, the court focused on the limiting
language of the Pennsylvania statute (limiting standing to
grandparents and great-grandparents) and the presumption that a fit
parent acts in a child's best interest as adequate protections for the
parental due process right.
157
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion in Hiller contained
two important points. First, the court employed a strict scrutiny test
as the standard of review for an asserted infringement on a parent's
due process right to make child-rearing decisions.15 8 Second, the
court recognized a judicially-created presumption in favor of a fit
parent's visitation decisions, the same presumption that the
Washington Supreme Court failed to find in the Washington
statute. In the Hiller majority's opinion, the presumption
favoring the parent and the Pennsylvania statute's limited standing
153. Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875 (Pa. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1876
(2007).
154. Id.
155. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5311 (West 2001):
If a parent of an unmarried child is deceased, the parents or
grandparents of the deceased parent may be granted reasonable partial
custody or visitation rights, or both, to the unmarried child by the court
upon a finding that partial custody or visitation rights, or both, would
be in the best interest of the child and would not interfere with the
parent-child relationship. The court shall consider the amount of
personal contact between the parents or grandparents of the deceased
parent and the child prior to the application.
156. Id. The child's grandparents or great-grandparents can also seek partial
custody under the statute.
157. Hiller, 904 A.2d at 890.
158. Id. at 885 (also recognizing that the plurality in Troxel did not articulate
such a standard). See id. at 885 n.18 (citing cases where other states have
applied the strict scrutiny standard when examining third party visitation).
159. Id. at 887-88; Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69 (2000).
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class were sufficient for the statute to stand against a Troxel
challenge.
160
The dissenting judge in Hiller, however, believed that a
showing of harm or potential harm to the child absent visitation
should be required in order to prove a compelling state interest.' 61
Without a showing of harm or potential harm, according to the
dissent, a court's finding that visitation would be "better or more
desirable" for a child would be enough to supersede a parent's
opinion regarding visitation. 162 This type of court-ordered
visitation would directly contravene the parent's right to make
visitation decisions, causing the Pennsylvania statute to be
unconstitutional in application in situations where a court's opinion
of a child's best interest is favored over the decisions of a fit
parent. 63 However, the plurality opinion in Troxel declined to
examine whether third party visitation statutes must contain such a
showing of harm in order to adequately protect parental visitation
decisions. 164  The Washington statute contained no harm
requirement, and Justice Kennedy's dissent stated that such a
requirement was not warranted in every determination of a child's
best interest. 165 Viewing the Hiller dissent in light of Troxel, then,
the lack of a harm requirement alone will not invalidate a visitation
statute.
The Hiller decision makes two points that are critical to a
constitutional examination of Civil Code article 136. First, strict
scrutiny, the standard mentioned by Justice Thomas's concurrence
in Troxel,166 should be the standard of review for challenges to the
parental due process right.167 Second, a showing of harm to the
child by denying visitation is not required when a visitation statute
is narrow in scope and contains sufficiently high hurdles to
overcome the presumption in favor of the parent.' 6 According to
the rationale from Hiller, article 136 must sufficiently limit the
160. Hiller, 904 A.2d at 890.
161. Id. at 904 (Cappy, C.J., dissenting).
162. Id.
163. Id. at904-05.
164. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73 ("[W]e do not consider the primary constitutional
question passed on by the Washington Supreme Court[-]whether the Due
Process Clause requires all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing
of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting
visitation.").
165. Id. at 86 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
167. Hiller, 904 A.2d at 885.
168. Id. at 890. The dissent disagrees that express requirements in the
Pennsylvania statute alone suffice to protect the parental due process right. Id. at
904 (Cappy, C.J., dissenting).
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class of persons with standing and contain safeguards 169 to protect
the presumption that a parent acts in a child's best interest.
3. Court of Appeals of New York: E.S. v.P.D.170
Six months after the Hiller decision, the Court of Appeals of
New York decided E.S. v. P.D.,171 a case that confirmed the
constitutionality of New York's grandparental visitation statute,
New York Domestic Relations Law section 72(1) (hereinafter
"New York statute"). 172 The New York statute, in pertinent part,
allows the parents of a deceased parent (child's grandparents) to
seek visitation when such visitation is in the child's best interest
and when "circumstances show that conditions exist which equity
would see fit to intervene." 173 Much like the state court cases
discussed in this Note supra, 174 the Court of Appeals of New York
declined to find its statute unconstitutional in light of Troxel
because the New York statute was narrowly tailored and contained
a judicially-imposed presumption giving due weight to a parent's
visitation decision.' The decision in E.S. also illustrated an
instance where the presumption favoring the fit parent was
overcome by a party seeking visitation. 176 The petitioning
grandmother, who had acted as a live-in mother for the child
between ages four and seven, was able to prove circumstances that
169. The safeguards in article 136 include the requirements of "extraordinary
circumstances" and that visitation be "reasonable." LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art.
136(B) (1999). For a discussion of the adequacy of these safeguards, see infra
Part IV.A-B.
170. E.S. v. P.D., 863 N.E.2d 100 (N.Y. 2007).
171. Id.
172. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72(1) (McKinney Supp. 2008):
Where either or both of the parents of a minor child, residing within
this state, is or are deceased, or where circumstances show that
conditions exist which equity would see fit to intervene, a grandparent
or the grandparents of such child may apply to the supreme court by
commencing a special proceeding or for a writ of habeas corpus to have
such child brought before such court, or may apply to the family court
pursuant to subdivision (b) of section six hundred fifty-one of the
family court act; and on the return thereof, the court, by order, after due
notice to the parent or any other person or party having the care,
custody, and control of such child, to be given in such manner as the
court shall prescribe, may make such directions as the best interest of
the child may require, for visitation rights for such grandparent or
grandparents in respect to such child.
173. Id.
174. See supra Part III.A-B.
175. E.S., 863 N.E.2d at 105-06.
176. Id.
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warranted visitation despite the father's decision to deny her
visitation. 1
77
The E.S. decision showed that a presumption in favor of the
parent can be read into a visitation statute by a court in order to
ensure the statute's constitutional application.' 71 In Troxel, the
Supreme Court recognized that the Washington state courts failed
to impose a similar presumption but acknowledged that the state
courts could have read a presumption into the statute, possibly
making the statute's application constitutional. 179 In E.S., however,
the New York state courts correctly observed and weighed the
parental presumption before issuing a visitation order under
conditions that overcame that presumption. 18 Using this rationale,
a visitation order will be upheld, and a visitation statute may be
constitutional, if the trial court observes a presumption in favor of
a fit parent's visitation decisions.
In the context of Civil Code article 136, the E.S. case
demonstrates two important points regarding presumptions. First,
the existence of a presumption favoring the parent's discretion is
critical to the constitutional application of a grandparental or third
party visitation statute.' 8 1 Second, constitutionally sound drafting
does not require that the presumption be expressly included in the
text of a visitation statute. State courts have the authority to impose
a presumption favoring the parent when applying visitation statutes
to help protect the parent's constitutional rights.1 8 2 Therefore,
although a presumption that a parent acts in a child's best interest
is essential to a visitation statute's constitutionality, the
presumption may be absent from the statutory text, as is the case
with article 136.
177. The considerations bearing upon the child's best interest were "the
reasonableness of father's objections to grandmother's access to the child, her
caregiving skills and attitude toward father, the law guardian's assessment, [and]
the child's wishes." Id. at 160-61.
178. Id. at 159-60.
179. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69-70 (2000).
180. E.S., 863 N.E.2d at 106.
181. Id. at 105 ("[I]f a fit parent's decision of the kind at issue here becomes
subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some special weight to
the parent's own determination." (citing Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70)).
182. See id. at 106; Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69-70.
183. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136(B) (1999) (statute contains no expression
of presumption favoring parent).
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4. Minnesota Supreme Court: Soohoo v. Johnson 184
Finally, in May of 2007 the Minnesota Supreme Court
invalidated a section of its grandparental visitation statute in
Soohoo v. Johnson.185 The ruling struck down subdivision 7 of
Minnesota Statutes section 257C.08 (hereinafter "Minnesota
statute"), which allowed for the denial of visitation rights if, after a
hearing, the court determined that such visitation would interfere
with the parent-child relationship.' 86 The Minnesota Supreme
Court interpreted subdivision 7 of the Minnesota statute as placing
the evidentiary burden on the parent denying visitation in an
"interference" hearing. 187  First, according to Soohoo, the
placement of the evidentiary burden on the parent violated the
parental due process right by failing to recognize the presumption
that a fit parent acts in a child's best interest.188 Second, the
preponderance of evidence standard expressed in subdivision 7 of
the Minnesota statute was insufficient to protect the parental
presumption even if the burden were correctly placed on the
petitioning party.' 
8 9
As to this second point (the need for a heightened burden of
proof), the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that a clear and
convincing evidentiary standard is required when the interests at
stake in any given proceeding are "particularly important" and
"more substantial than mere loss of money."1  The Minnesota
Supreme Court also recognized, and this Note has also stated, 191
that the parental right to direct a child's upbringing is one of theI . . 192
most fundamental liberties afforded by the Constitution.
Therefore, a clear and convincin evidentiary standard is
warranted to protect this sacred right.193
184. Soohoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 2007).
185. Id. at 824.
186. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257C.08(7) (West 2007), entitled Establishment of
Interference with Parent and Child Relationship: "The court may not deny
visitation rights under this section based on allegations that the visitation rights
would interfere with the relationship between the custodial parent and the child
unless after a hearing the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence
that interference would occur."
187. Soohoo, 731 N.W.2d at 824.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 823 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982)).
191. See supra Part 1.
192. Soohoo, 731 N.W.2d at 823. See also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,
65 (2000); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
193. Soohoo, 731 N.W.2d at 824.
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In sum, the Soohoo decision mandated the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard for a petitioning party to show circumstances
justifying a visitation order. A preponderance of evidence standard
does not adequately protect the fundamental right at stake in
visitation proceedings. Employing such a low evidentiary standard
and placing the evidentiary burden on the parent objecting to the
visitation violates that right and effectively nullifies the
presumption that the parent is acting in the child's best interest. 194
Therefore, the higher burden of proof and requiring the petitioning
party to bear the burden are necessary to prevent an
unconstitutional infringement.
Civil Code article 136 contains no express standard of proof. In
the absence of statutory language to the contrary, the default
evidentiary standard in Louisiana is preponderance of evidence.' 95
However, article 136 contains other hurdles that may suffice in lieu
of an elevated evidentiary standard. 196 Part IV of this Note will
address this issue in more detail.
C. Guideposts for Constitutional Considerations
Common themes emerge when investigating the
constitutionality of grandparental and third party visitation rights in
both Louisiana case law and that of other states. In conducting
such an analysis, a non-parent visitation statute must be written
and construed in a manner that will not unconstitutionally infringe
on a parent's right to make visitation decisions on behalf of a child.
Only then will a visitation statute have a consistent constitutional
application. In light of that consideration, and from the cases
examined supra, this author recognizes two guideposts for judging
the constitutionality of a visitation statute in general: (1) A
visitation statute must be sufficiently narrow in scope by limiting
both the class of persons with standing to seek visitation and the
circumstances in which visitation can be sought. 19 7 (2) A visitation
statute must provide heightened burdens of proof, including the
194. Id.
195. See FRANK L. MARAIST, EVIDENCE AND PROOF § 4.2, in 19 LOUISIANA
CIVIL LAW TREATISE 48 (2006) [hereinafter MARAIST § 4.2] ("In a civil case the
burden of persuasion generally is a 'preponderance of the evidence,' i.e.,
evidence from which reasonable minds could conclude, more probably than not,
the existence of the essential facts.").
196. See infra Part IV.B.2.
197. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000); Shaw v. Dupuy, 961
So. 2d 5, 10-11 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2007) (Whipple, J., concurring); Galjour v.
Harris, 795 So. 2d 350, 358 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 793 So. 2d 1229
(La.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1020 (2001).
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presumption that a parent acts in a child's best interest, to
adequately protect the parental due process right. 1
98
Supported by pre- and post-Troxel state court decisions, these
guideposts, along with the overarching consideration that a third
party visitation statute be constitutionally applied, provide a
roadmap for the following inquiry into the validity of Civil Code
article 136. With these conclusions in mind, the following section
of this Note specifically examines the constitutionality of Civil
Code article 136.
IV. ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE 136
The following analysis discusses the constitutional standards
and shortcomings of article 136. Subsections A through C examine
the article against the guideposts listed in the preceding section.
Subsection D provides this author's conclusions of law for a
constitutionally sound reading of the article.
A. Statutory Scope
1. Class of Persons with Standing
In Troxel, part of the majority's reasoning for finding the
Washington statute "breathtakingly broad" was that the provision
allowed any third party to petition for visitation rights to a child
regardless of the petitioner's relationship with the child.199
According to Justice O'Connor's majority opinion, the Washington
statute left the door open for any person to subject a parent's
visitation decisions to state court review. 20 As mentioned earlier in
this Note, Troxel provides the extreme example of unconstitutional
statutory overbreadth in the context of grandparental and third
party visitation rights.20 ' On the other end of the spectrum,
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:344 and similar state statutes
discussed in Part III.B represent visitation statutes that provide
sufficiently narrow standing.
Paragraph B of Civil Code article 136-the part of the
provision applicable to third party visitation-limits standing to "a
relative, by blood or affinity, or a former step-parent or step-
198. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69-70; Soohoo, 731 N.W.2d at 824; Wood v.
Wood, 835 So. 2d 568, 575 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2002), writ denied, 840 So. 2d
565 (La. 2003).
199. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.10.160(3) (West 1994); Troxel, 530 U.S.
at 67.
200. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67.
201. See supra Part III.A.3.
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grandparent, not granted custody of the child., 20 2 This class of
persons clearly falls in the gray area between the unconstitutional
Washington statute and Louisiana Revised Statutes section
9:344.2u3 At least one Louisiana appellate court has recognized the
concern that article 136 may be unconstitutionally broad in
allowing any relative and select former relatives to seek
visitation. According to Judge Whipple's concurrence in Shaw,
article 136 improperly allows any relative to seek visitation and
subject a parent's child-rearing decisions to judicial review.20 5
Arguably, however, as the Louisiana First Circuit's pre-Troxel
opinion in Reinhardt suggests, article 136 contains sufficiently
narrow standing when combined with the article's other
requirements.
20 6
To further understand the breadth of article 136, Ohio's third
party visitation statutes are helpful in examining the article's
standing requirement. Ohio Revised Code section 3109.051(B)(1)
allows a court to grant visitation in certain circumstances to "any
grandparent, any person related to the child by consanguinity or
affinity, or any other person other than a parent," 20 7 a class of
persons that extends beyond mere family members to all third
parties. The Ohio Supreme Court stated in Harrold, however, that
the Ohio statute was not unconstitutionally broad because the
statute required certain "predicate events" that limited the instances
in which any third party could bring a visitation action. 20 8 This
opinion suggests that a visitation statute's broad standing
requirement may be offset by narrow predicate circumstances
expressed in the statute. Similarly, Louisiana Civil Code article
136 has an "extraordinary circumstances" requirement which may
ensure its constitutionality by compensating for its relatively large
standing base. 20 9 The following section contains a further
examination of the "extraordinary circumstances" requirement.
202. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136(B) (1999).
203. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:344 provides standing to a child's
grandparents and siblings in certain situations, namely the death, interdiction, or
incarceration of one of the child's parents.
204. See Shaw v. Dupuy, 961 So. 2d 5, 10 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2007) (Whipple,
J., concurring).
205. Id.
206. Reinhardt v. Reinhardt, 720 So. 2d 78, 80 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1998).
207. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.051(B)(1) (West 2005).
208. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.051; Harrold v. Collier, 836 N.E.2d
1165, 1171 (Ohio 2005).
209. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 136(B) (1999).
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2. Predicate Conditions
The first circumstantial requirement for initiating an action
under article 136 is evidenced by its placement in the Louisiana
Civil Code. Article 136 appears in the section governing divorce in
the Louisiana Civil Code.210 Using a pro subjecta materia
argument, 211 the article is only applicable in instances where a
child's parents are divorced or involved in a divorce proceeding.212
Therefore, unlike the unconstitutional Washington statute, a family
member may not petition for visitation under article 136 "at any
time. 213
The second circumstantial requirement of article 136 is much
less certain in definition. According to the article, the relative (or
former step-parent or step-grandparent) may only seek visitation
"[u]nder extraordinary circumstances.' This threshold finding of
"extraordinary circumstances" is critical to a proper application of
article 136, as stated by Louisiana's First Circuit in Reinhardt.215
Unlike Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:344-which allows
the visitation petition only in case of the death, interdiction, or
incarceration of a parent-article 136 (and the comments thereto)
neglect to define "extraordinary circumstances" in the visitation
context. Further, Louisiana courts have yet to establish a clear idea
of what circumstances rise to this level.
The first circuit in Shaw vaguely defined "extraordinary
circumstances" in the context of article 136 as a "highly unusual
set of facts. not commonly associated with a particular thing or
event."216 Despite the ambiguity of "extraordinary circumstances,"
Louisiana courts have found those circumstances only in extreme
210. Id. The article appears in Book I. Of Persons, Title V. Divorce of the
Louisiana Civil Code.
211. In a civilian context, an argument pro subjecta materia takes into
account "the place that the interpreted norm occupies in the given juridical text,"
presuming that the location of a Civil Code article provides clues to its meaning
and interpretation. KENNETH M. MURCHISON & J.-R. TRAHAN, WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITIONS AND SYSTEMS: LOUISIANA IMPACT 172 (La. State Univ. Publ'ns
2003). Since article 136 appears in the "Divorce" title of the Louisiana Civil
Code, it may be inferred that the article only applies in divorce situations despite
the article's lack of that express language. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 136.
212. See Reinhardt v. Reinhardt, 720 So. 2d 78, 80 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1998).
213. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.10.160(3) (West 1994).
214. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 136(B).
215. Reinhardt, 720 So. 2d at 80.
216. Shaw v. Dupuy, 961 So. 2d 5, 7 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2007), writ denied,
951 So. 2d 1092 (La. 2007) (citing Justice Weimer's concurrence in Huber v.
Midkiff, 838 So. 2d 771, 778 (La. 2003) (Weimer, J., concurring), which
adopted the definition of "extraordinary circumstance" from the seventh edition
of Black's Law Dictionary).
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factual situations. For instance, Louisiana's third circuit declined to
find "extraordinary circumstances" in a case where a fourth cousin
allegedly enjoyed a relationship with a child, was the trustee of a
trust created for the child's benefit, and would have facilitated a
relationship between the child and other family members.217
Louisiana courts have also declined to find such circumstances in
cases where the parent denying visitation is not shown to be
unfit.21 8  However, Louisiana's third circuit has held that
"extraordinary circumstances" exist for relatives when a parent is
deceased, as the natural conduit for maintaining a relationship
between the child and the deceased parent's family is missing.
2 r 9
These opinions provide little clarity to the definition of
"extraordinary circumstances." The only common theme among
these cases is summarized by the only Louisiana Supreme Court
pronouncement on the issue, a statement curiously circular: "Not
every unique set of circumstances will justify imposing visitation
only those circumstances which are truly extraordinary.22°
Whatever these circumstances entail, they are clearly narrower in
scope than the Washington statute in Troxel.
221
The relatively broad standing base allowed by article 136 is
complemented by the arguably narrow circumstances in which the
article may be employed. If the Louisiana Supreme Court were to
use the same rationale as the Ohio Supreme Court,222 article 136
should be sufficiently narrow to avoid subjecting nearly all
parental visitation decisions to legal challenge. Although the
definition of "extraordinary circumstances" is questionable at best
the circumstantial requirements of divorce and "highly unusual ,221
circumstances balance the concern for allowing any relative to
subject all parental visitation decisions to state court review.224
This sliding-scale approach-balancing the breadth of standing
with circumstantial requirements-would allow Civil Code article
217. See Sterling v. Shirley, 832 So. 2d 1179, 1182 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2002).
218. See, e.g., Flack v. Dickson, 843 So. 2d 1261, 1265 (La. App. 3d Cir.
2003); State ex rel. Satchfield v. Guillot, 820 So. 2d 1255, 1264-65 (La. App.
3d Cir. 2002).
219. See Ray v. Ray, 657 So. 2d 171, 173 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1995). The
petitioners in this case were a great-grandfather and aunt of the child; therefore,
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:344 was inapplicable. Id.
220. Huber, 838 So. 2d at 778 (Weimer, J., concurring).
221. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.10.160(3) (West 1994) (allowing
petitioners to bring a visitation action "at any time").
222. See supra Part IV.A. 1; Harrold v. Collier, 836 N.E.2d 1165, 1171 (Ohio
2005).
223. See Sterling v. Shirley, 832 So. 2d 1179, 1182 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2002).
224. See, e.g., Shaw v. Dupuy, 961 So. 2d 5, 10 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2007)
(Whipple, J., concurring).
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136 to survive a facial constitutionality challenge despite its large
standing class. In sum whether article 136 meets the requirement
of the first guidepost2 will depend on how narrowly (or broadly)
Louisiana courts construe "extraordinary circumstances."
B. Burdens of Proof and the Parental Presumption
Civil Code article 136 provides two major requirements for
allowing a non-parent third party visitation to a child. The first of
these requirements, "extraordinary circumstances," was discussed
in the preceding section.226 The second requirement is that sought-
after visitation must be in "the best interest of the child. 227 The
burdens and presumption relating to these article 136 requirements
are visited in this section.
1. Extraordinary Circumstances
The threshold burden of proof for bringing a visitation action
pursuant to article 136 (assuming the party seeking visitation
qualifies as a relative with standing) 28 is a showing that
"extraordinary circumstances" exist to justify the petition for
visitation.229 The burden of proving such circumstances falls on the
party seeking visitation-not on the parent denying visitation.
230
As mentioned, however, what circumstances qualify as
"extraordinary" is still an unclear issue in Louisiana case law. At
a bare minimum, "extraordinary circumstances" means that a
relative, former step-parent, or former step-grandparent will not be
allowed to petition for visitation based solely on their legal
relationship with the child.232 The non-parent petitioner must
therefore supply evidence sufficient in weight to show that
circumstances exist, other than the petitioner's familial relationshi
with the child, that amount to a "highly unusual set of facts.
Louisiana courts have recognized several facts that may be
225. See supra Part III.C.
226. See supra Part IV.A.2.
227. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136(B) (1999).
228. See supra Part IV.A.1.
229. Reinhardt v. Reinhardt, 720 So. 2d 78, 80 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1998).
230. Id.
231. See supra Part IV.A.2.
232. "The mere status of the mover for visitation as a grandparent, relative,
or step-relation is not sufficient to meet the requirements of article 136B."
Reinhardt, 720 So. 2d at 80.
233. See Shaw v. Dupuy, 961 So. 2d 5, 7 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 951
So. 2d 1092 (La. 2007).
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introduced by a petitioner in an attempt to overcome the
"extraordinary circumstances" hurdle, including, but not limited to,
the fitness of the custodial parent,234 any previous history of
petitioner and child living together, 235 the impossibility of
petitioner maintaining a relationship with the child due to death or
absence of a parent,236 and any caregiving 3 7responsibilities
performed by the petitioner on behalf of the child.
Article 136 does not express an evidentiary burden for proving
the existence of "extraordinary circumstances," so by default the
standard of proof is by preponderance of evidence.2 m As seen in
Soohoo, the Minnesota Supreme Court found the preponderance of
evidence standard to be insufficiently low for protecting a parent's
due process right in visitation proceedings.239 However, as the
vague yet judicially-adopted definition of "extraordinary
circumstances" requires, "highly unusual" facts must be presented
to meet the threshold evidentiary burden in article 136.240
Therefore, a party seeking visitation must present more convincing
evidence than the simple "more probable than not' ' 241 standard in
order to prove the existence of circumstances warranting a
visitation order.
2. Child's Best Interest
After clearing the hurdle of proving "extraordinary
circumstances," article 136 requires a second burden of proof.
Article 136 allows a court to grant visitation rights to a petitioning
non-parent only "if the court finds that [visitation] is in the best
234. See Huber v. Midkiff, 838 So. 2d 771, 778 (La. 2003) (Weimer, J.,
concurring).
235. See Ray v. Ray, 657 So. 2d 171, 173 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1995) (citing
trial judge's written reasons for judgment).
236. Id.
237. See Henry v. Henry, 704 So. 2d 793, 796 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997).
238. See MARAIST § 4.2, supra note 195, at 67. "In a civil case the burden of
persuasion generally is a 'preponderance of the evidence,' i.e., evidence from
which reasonable minds could conclude, more probably than not, the existence
of the essential facts." Id.
239. See Soohoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815, 824 (Minn. 2007). For a
discussion of the inadequacy of the preponderance of evidence standard, see
supra Part III.B.4.
240. See Shaw v. Dupuy, 961 So. 2d 5, 7 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 951
So. 2d 1092 (La. 2007).
241. "In Louisiana civil cases, proof by a preponderance of the evidence is
defined as evidence, when taken as a whole, shows that the fact or cause to be
proven is more probable than not." WILLIAM E. CRAWFoRD, TORT LAW § 6.2, in
12 LouIsIANA CIvIL LAW TREATISE 114 (2007).
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interest of the child., 242 Paragraph B of the article also contains
five factors that the court is required to consider when determining
the child's best interest.243 These elements of article 136 are
examined in the following section of this Note.
a. The Parental Presumption and Petitioner's Burden
The first and most critical consideration for applying non-
parent visitation statutes is the presumption that a fit parent acts in
the best interest of a child.244 This parental presumption affords
great deference to a parent's decisions to allow or deny visitation
to a child.245 Although Civil Code article 136 does not contain
express language requiring a court to apply the parental
presumption, this requirement can be inferred from Louisiana First
Circuit decisions which require the same standard for a proceeding
under Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:344.246 The parental
presumption accomplishes two objectives. First, the presumption
lends "special weight" to a parent's decisions regarding child
visitation,247 protecting the parent's due process right against a
court-ordered visitation when such visitation may be merely
"better" for the child.248 Second, the presumption places the burden
of persuasion on a party seeking visitation to show that visitation is
in the child's best interest despite the wishes of the custodial
parent.249 These two elements are essential to a constitutional
application of article 136.
Because article 136 contains no express evidentiary standard,
one might assume that a mere preponderance of the evidence is
sufficient to satisfy the "best interest" requirement. In considering
a child's best interest, a preponderance of the evidence standard
would lend ultimate weight to a trier of fact's opinion regarding a
child's welfare. In nearly all instances, a parent, not a court, is in
the best position to make decisions regarding a child's best
interest. The low preponderance standard arguably would fail to
242. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136(B) (1999).
243. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136(B)(1)-(5).
244. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67-69 (2000).
245. Id. at 66-67.
246. See Barry v. McDaniel, 934 So. 2d 69, 76 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2006);
Wood v. Wood, 835 So. 2d 568, 575 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 835 So. 2d
568 (La. 2002).
247. Wood, 835 So. 2d at 575.
248. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72; Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875, 904 (Pa.
2006) (Cappy, C.J., dissenting).
249. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69; Reinhardt v. Reinhardt, 720 So.2d 78, 80
(La. App. I st Cir. 1998).
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ensure a parent's due process right from unconstitutional
infringement, as evidenced in Soohoo.250 However, a Louisiana
court may observe a higher evidentiary standard despite the default
preponderance of the evidence standard when certain rights are at
stake.2 5  As seen in Troxel, a state court has the authority to read
heightened standards into its own state statutes. 252 Along with a
judicially-imposed clear and convincing standard of proof, a
presumption favoring a parent's visitation decisions would force a
trial court not only to consider the wishes of the parent but also to
give weighted deference to those decisions when the parent is not
shown to be unfit.
By giving parental visitation decisions presumptive weight, the
burden then falls on the petitioner to prove that visitation is in the
253child's best interest. Again, this burden cannot be met by a
simple preponderance of the evidence-a greater evidentiary
showing is required.254 In any event, the onus is on the petitioner to
provide strong evidence to justify a court order to disrupt the
child's current visitation situation.
The parent's due process right may also require a showing that
denying visitation would cause harm to the child.255 The plurality
opinion and Justice Souter's concurrence mentioned the issue of
harm in Troxel, but both opinions declined to decide whether a
showing of harm was necessarily within the scope of the parental
256due process right. In Louisiana's first circuit, at least one pre-
Troxel dissenting opinion considered the need for a harm
requirement to facilitate a "compelling" state interest for scrutiny
purposes.2 5 7 Apparently, the showing of harm may be crucial when
a visitation statute does not employ the parental presumption, for if
the presumption is recognized, the resulting burden of rebuttal
should protect the parental due process right from constant or
arbitrary challenges. As article 136 contains neither an express
parental presumption nor harm requirement, Louisiana courts must
250. See Soohoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815, 824 (Minn. 2007).
251. See, e.g., Succession of Lyons, 452 So. 2d 1161 (La. 1984) (employing
a clear and convincing standard where policy considerations disfavor the use of
a preponderance of evidence standard). The "policy" consideration in this
analysis (the fundamental parental right to direct a child's upbringing) may
necessitate the use of a clear and convincing standard.
252. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 79 (Souter, J., concurring).
253. Soohoo, 731 N.W.2d. at 824.
254. Id.
255. See Reinhardt v. Reinhardt, 720 So. 2d 78, 81 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1998)
(Guidry, J., dissenting).
256. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73 (plurality opinion); id, at 77 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
257. Reinhardt, 720 So. 2d at 81 (Guidry, J., dissenting).
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decide how to construe article 136 to heighten the "best interest of
the child" burden.
b. Best Interest Factors
Paragraph B of article 136 lists five factors to be considered by
a trier of fact when determining a child's best interest:
(1) The length and quality of the prior relationship between
the child and the relative.
(2) Whether the child is in need of guidance,
enlightenment, or tutelage which can best be provided by
the relative.
(3) The preference of the child if he is determined to be of
sufficient maturity to express a preference.
(4) The willingness of the relative to encourage a close
relationship between the child and his parent or parents.
(5) The mental and physical health of the child and the
relative.2
58
These five issues are required considerations in a trial court's
initial visitation order.259 By expressing five distinct "best interest"
factors, article 136 provides semi-objective 260 considerations in
place of the sole subjective discretion of a trial court judge. To
some extent, then, the factors help define the scope of the "best
interest" determination, but they do little to strengthen the
petitioner's burden of persuasion. Conspicuously absent from these
factors is any reference to a presumption that a parent acts in a
child's best interest. As one commentator noted, the lack of
express deference to a parent's wishes may present a problem for
article 136,261 potentially subjecting the article to unconstitutional
application.
In brief, for Civil Code article 136 to comply with the second
guidepost for constitutionally sound visitation statutes, 262 key
points must be observed by Louisiana courts applying the article.
A trier of fact must recognize the strong presumption that a parent
258. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136(B)(l)-(5) (1999).
259. "In determining the best interest of the child, the court shall consider...."
LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 136(B) (emphasis added).
260. The factors still warrant the subjectivity of a trier of fact. For example, a
judge must still determine whether the child is in need of "guidance,
enlightenment, or tutelage" and whether the party seeking visitation can best
provide these. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136(B)(2).
261. See ROBERT C. LOwE, LOUISIANA DIVORCE § 7:71, in LOuISIANA
PRACTICE SERIES (2007).
262. See supra Part III.C.
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makes visitation decisions in a child's best interest and afford great
deference to those parental determinations in order to preventjudicial infringement on a parent's due process right to make child-
rearing decisions.2 63 Courts applying article 136 must also impose
two burdens on the party seeking visitation to prove both that
"extraordinary circumstances" exist and that the desired visitation
is in the child's "best interest."26 These separate burdens must
require a heightened evidentiary standard beyond mere
preponderance of evidence 265 standards that can be achieved by
requiring "highly unusual ' 'N66 circumstances and by imposing a
strong parental presumption. The constitutionality of article 136
will be adequately protected only with the parental presumption
and elevated burdens of proof.
C. Facial Validity and Constitutional Application
As mentioned, the central consideration in an analysis of a
third party visitation statute is the statute's ability to be
consistently constitutionally applied.267 Facial validity is the initial
inquiry into the constitutionality of a non-parent visitation statute.
As a general matter, statutes carry a presumption of
constitutionality268 but will be found facially invalid if statutory
overbreadth leads to unconstitutional results in all applications. 26
As noted by Justice Souter, the plurality's judgment in Troxel
declined to hold the Washington statute facially unconstitutional,
despite that statute's "breathtakingly broad" standing and
circumstance requirements. 270 Considering Troxel, and given the
comparatively narrow language of Civil Code article 136 in
comparison to the Washington statute, the article is sufficiently
263. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000).
264. See Reinhardt v. Reinhardt, 720 So. 2d 78, 80 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1998).
The burden on the petitioner to show "best interest" is inherent in the
recognition of the presumption that a parent acts in a child's best interest.
265. See Soohoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815, 821 (Minn. 2007).
266. See Shaw v. Dupuy, 961 So. 2d 5, 7 (La. App. 1 st Cir.), writ denied, 951
So. 2d 1092 (La. 2007).
267. See supra Part III.C.
268. Reinhardt, 720 So. 2d at 79.
269. See generally City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 70-73 (1999)(Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that an ordinance that allows police to enjoy too
much discretion in every case is facially invalid because the ordinance is
unconstitutional in all applications).
270. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 75-79 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring)(stating the Washington statute was facially unconstitutional). See WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.10.160(3) (West 1994).
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written to avoid unconstitutionality in all circumstances. 27 1 Almost
assuredly, therefore, article 136 is not unconstitutional on its face.
The main inquiry involved in an analysis of article 136 is the
potential for unconstitutional application of the provision. The
article must contain sufficient safeguards to shield the fundamental
parental right at stake in non-parent visitation statutes. The parental
due process right to direct the upbringing of a child, including the
right to make visitation decisions regarding the child and third
parties, "is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by [the Supreme] Court.' 272 In turn, such an important
and sacred parental right necessitates a strict level of scrutiny for
laws that interfere with that right.273 To pass a strict scrutiny test, a
visitation statute must further a compelling state interest to foster
relationships between children and relatives. 274 According to
Reinhardt, state encouragement of "beneficial extended family
relationships with children" is both a legitimate and substantial
state interest. 275 Therefore, the purpose of article 136 is
constitutional.
Given the valid governmental interest advanced by article 136,
the constitutional application of the article depends on its scope,
the parental presumption, and the heightened burdens of proof
required by the two guideposts for visitation statute
constitutionality.276 Constitutional application requires Louisiana
courts to distinguish a narrow set of "extraordinary circumstances"
for bringing a visitation action, to recognize a strong parental
presumption by giving deference to parental visitation decisions,
and to impose heightened burdens on a party seeking visitation to
show "extraordinary circumstances" and "best interest." 27 7 These
safeguards are necessary to protect the fundamental parental right
of child-rearing against improper infringement. Hence, the
recognition of these factors in practice should guarantee the
constitutional application of article 136 in every factual situation.
271. Compare Huber v. Midkiff, 838 So. 2d 771, 778 (La. 2003) (Weimer,
J., concurring) with E.S. v. P.D., 863 N.E.2d 100, 106 (N.Y. 2007) ("If the
United States Supreme Court did not declare the 'breathtakingly broad'
Washington statute to be facially invalid, then certainly the more narrowly
drafted New York statute is not unconstitutional on its face.").
272. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
273. See id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring); Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875,
885 (Pa. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1876 (2007); Reinhardt, 720 So. 2d at
79-80.
274. See Reinhardt, 720 So. 2d at 80.
275. Id.
276. See supra Part IV.A-B.
277. Again, by definition, the parental presumption places the burden on the
petitioner to show "best interest."
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D. Conclusions of Law
Based on the court opinions, statutes, and issues examined in
this Note and the preceding analysis, this author finds three main
points of law necessary to secure the validity of Civil Code article
136.
First, Louisiana trial courts must narrowly construe
"extraordinary circumstances." This threshold predicate
circumstance must tightly limit the exposure of parental visitation
decisions to compensate for the comparatively broad standing
afforded to all relatives. In the alternative, the Louisiana
Legislature may amend Paragraph B of article 136 to limit the
class of relatives with standing to a child's ascendants and
collateral relatives within the fourth degree. Either of these options
may sufficiently narrow the scope of article 136.
Second, Louisiana trial courts must acknowledge the existence
of the presumption that a fit parent always acts in a child's best
interest and respect that presumption by deferring to the parent's
visitation decisions whenever plausible. As discussed earlier,
Louisiana courts have the authority to narrowly construe article
136 to require such a presumption. Also, a strong parental
presumption will rightly place the burden of proof on the party
seeking visitation to show that the visitation is in the child's best
interest.
Finally, Louisiana trial courts must place two heightened
evidentiary burdens on a non-parent seeking visitation. The non-
parent must bear the burden of showing "extraordinary
circumstances" and "best interest" to a degree beyond the
inadequate preponderance of evidence standard. The latter burden
of proof is created by the recognition of a parental presumption.
The heightened evidentiary standard may be judicially imposed by
a Louisiana court reading a clear and convincing standard into
article 136 or by legislative amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court decision in Troxel casts
doubt and uncertainty over grandparental and third party visitation
statutes in every state. Louisiana appellate courts have affirmed the
validity of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:344, but those
same courts have yet to rule on the constitutionality of Louisiana
Civil Code article 136. Further, precluding one concurring opinion,
the Louisiana Supreme Court has yet to address a constitutional
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challenge to either provision.278 In light of three very recent state
supreme court rulings interpreting Troxel, article 136 is ripe for
another constitutional attack at the Louisiana appellate and
Supreme Court levels. By tweaking the article, Louisiana courts
may be able to adequately protect the parental due process right
and further the substantial state interest in fostering "beneficial
extended family relationships with children.2 79 Only then will
Louisiana courts have the tools needed to protect the respective
roles that parents and other relatives play in a child's life. After all,
Louisiana's best interest depends on the future of its children.
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